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Numerous conferences organized in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial
crisis of 1997–98 offered analyses of what went wrong in the crisis
countries. The immediacy of the crisis prompted a number of reform
proposals directed toward reducing the risk of future crises. However,
now that the crisis has abated, reform appears to be much lower on most
political agendas, and the progress that countries are making toward
implementing reform is rarely the topic of media reports or academic
inquiries. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s June 2000 conference
“Building an Infrastructure for Financial Stability” attempted to address
this deﬁciency. Conference participants reexamined the recommenda-
tions made following the ﬁnancial crisis and attempted to better under-
stand why the adoption of reforms has proved to be so difﬁcult.
Many of the conferences held soon after the crisis examined imbal-
ances in international ﬁnancial markets as well as imbalances in the
macroeconomies of the crisis countries. Recommended policy responses
often required some form of global coordination. In contrast, our confer-
ence focused on the ﬁnancial infrastructure of individual countries – legal
systems, accounting systems, banking sectors, and securities markets.
Several experts highlighted the fact that the countries with the greatest
deﬁciencies in their ﬁnancial infrastructure experienced the most severe
hardship during the crisis. The conference focused on reforms that
countries could adopt unilaterally.
Participants reported that many of the crisis countries have made
substantial improvements on several economic fronts, but they also
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ton.reported that the pace of adoption of infrastructure reform has been less
ambitious than the rhetoric during and immediately following the crisis.
Once the crisis had passed, implementing corrective measures clashed
with the reality that such measures often impinged on political, eco-
nomic, and social norms in the local economies. As the local economies
improved, forces for change began to fade, while resistance to change
strengthened as it became clearer who would be adversely affected by
reform. As a result, policymakers frequently have been reluctant to
implement substantive change.
As conference participants presented their analyses of the reform
process in various countries, a common theme became apparent: Those
recommending reform need to do a better job of recognizing political,
economic, and social constraints facing individual countries. These con-
straints tend to be the true impediments to successfully implementing
reform. When one takes these constraints into account, one can begin to
understand why more substantive reform has not occurred. In addition to
this general theme, conference participants provided several recommen-
dations that should be considered when attempting to improve the
ﬁnancial infrastructure of emerging economies.
First, countries should focus much more attention on improving the
enforcement of existing laws, accounting requirements, investor protec-
tions, and bank supervisory practices. Too much emphasis has been
placed on introducing new reforms, too little emphasis on improving the
effectiveness of the existing ﬁnancial infrastructure. Conference partici-
pants emphasized that most countries have prudent legal statutes in
place, some form of minimum accounting standards, and regulatory
agencies in charge of bank supervision and investor protection. However,
enforcement is problematic. Court systems often lack the authority to
enforce contracts and existing laws; accounting standards and investor
protections are often ignored, and bank regulatory agencies often lack the
political independence needed to implement prudent supervisory policy.
Second, where reform is needed, one must do a better job of molding
the reform so that it ﬁts the societal norms of the recipient country.
Failure to take into account how a society’s values will affect the
implementation of a speciﬁc reform may render the reform ineffective.
For example, conference participants discussed the appropriateness of
using the U.S. bankruptcy code as a model for emerging economies
reforming their legal systems. Since domestic courts must interpret the
code on a case-by-case basis, the degree to which a country protects
debtor versus creditor will depend on what the society views as fair.
Similarly, for countries with different value systems than that of the
United States, recommending that a country adopt U.S.-type accounting
standards and investor protections for their domestically listed ﬁrms may
be inappropriate.
Finally, most agreed that speciﬁc reforms are likely to work differ-
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bases its legal system on common law. Legal systems in civil law
countries are characterized by far less ﬂexibility, following the “letter of
the law” closely. These countries also tend to have concentrated owner-
ship structures with bank-dominated sources of external ﬁnance. In
contrast, common law countries have more ﬂexibility, with legal prece-
dents playing an important role, and they tend to have more diverse
ownership structures with well-developed capital markets. These differ-
ences affect a diverse group of reforms. The demand for investor
protections and extensive disclosure policies will differ across these two
types of countries, as will the role of bank regulation.
The following provides an overview of the conference discussions
rather than a summary of individual papers. In part, this is because the
papers are generally accessible, with little need for clariﬁcation in an
overview. However, the main reason is that the conference was high-
lighted by spirited discussions that often extended and ampliﬁed the
arguments made in the papers included in this volume.
LESSONS FROM THE EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCE
In his opening address, Jagdish N. Bhagwati examined the reasons
behind the Asian miracle of 20 years of strong economic growth and the
subsequent crisis experienced in the late 1990s. He ﬁrst noted that not all
of Asia shared equally in the prosperity. India was one of the notable
exceptions. Bhagwati explained that India suffered from two major
problems. First, “Adam Smith’s invisible hand was nowhere to be seen.”
Government intervention stiﬂed the ability of the private sector to
ﬂourish, a problem common in many developing countries. Second, the
Indian government adopted an economic development policy with an
inward focus, promoting growth of traditional domestic sectors such as
agriculture. Such a policy limited the growth of the domestic economy. In
contrast, countries that focused on outward development had much more
success. Several of the most prosperous Asian countries imported new
technologies from abroad and coupled these technologies with their own
low-cost labor, enabling them to export domestically produced goods
worldwide. This outward focus was a highly successful model, and one
that developing countries outside of East Asia are only now beginning to
emulate.
While this outward orientation enabled many of the East Asian
countries to build highly developed manufacturing sectors, their ﬁnancial
sectors did not progress as quickly. Bhagwati argued that the weak
ﬁnancial sector eventually culminated in the East Asian crisis. In defense
of this explanation, he dismissed an alternative explanation of the crisis,
diminishing returns. While some may believe that the high returns East
Asian countries experienced from their investment boom were destined
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returns, Bhagwati strongly disagreed. He argued that technology should
have delayed the onset of diminishing returns, and that even if dimin-
ishing returns were really a problem, one would not expect the problem
then to appear almost overnight. He believes the evidence is more
consistent with a ﬁnancial crisis. In particular, problems in the banking
sector, with its excessive lending and heavy reliance on foreign-currency-
denominated debt, formed the primary cause of the crisis. He also
believes that poor policy decisions exacerbated the crisis, partly a result
of pressure from international organizations.
In closing, Bhagwati stated that while the ﬁnancial sectors of many of
the East Asian economies need reform and must become internationally
competitive, he did not favor some of the more dramatic recommenda-
tions for reform. In particular, he did not view favorably the sweeping
changes proposed for the industrial organization structures in some East
Asian countries, such as recommendations to eliminate chaebol and
keiretsu groupings. He believes that these organizational structures,
based on the unique cultural norms of individual countries, played an
important role in East Asia’s prosperity. Such recommendations show
how outside agencies often fail to take into account the cultural frame-
work of a country, trying to impose their own economic models on a
country where they may not ﬁt. Bhagwati was optimistic about East
Asia’s future, however. With improvements in the ﬁnancial sector, he
believes that the countries will regain their manufacturing prowess, and
that East Asia will again be a high-growth area.
BUILDING AN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY:
LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
John L. Walker’s paper examines the legal infrastructure of six
emerging economies, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, China,
and Russia. In his review of the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–98, he found that
inadequacies in the countries’ legal systems were not the primary causes
of the crisis, but that these inadequacies did contribute to the tremendous
cost of the crisis. Walker focused on the improvements these six countries
have made in their legal infrastructure, examining the progress that has
been made in establishing bankruptcy laws, providing an environment
that allows parties to engage in secured transactions, ensuring the
enforceability of contracts through the judicial system, and developing a
bank regulatory and supervisory framework that promotes a stable
ﬁnancial system.
In comparing the legal and regulatory frameworks of Thailand,
Indonesia, and South Korea, Walker noted that Indonesia has the weakest
legal system, South Korea the strongest. He pointed out that this ranking
is correlated with the degree of hardship these countries experienced
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the most advanced legal system among the six countries he examined.
Walker thought Russia had made substantial progress in developing a
legal framework, but it still lags in the implementation necessary to
develop a culture of law. China’s legal and regulatory framework is
behind that of the other ﬁve countries, but Walker believes that the
impact of the East Asian crisis on China was minimal because it had yet
to deregulate its ﬁnancial system.
Based on his review, Walker draws the lesson that developing
countries must have a sound foundation for their legal system, in each of
the four areas listed above, before going ahead with widespread ﬁnancial
deregulation and liberalization. Finally, he warned that these countries
still have much more progress to make in implementing reform before a
culture of law is well established.
The ﬁrst discussant, Holly J. Gregory, emphasized the importance of
social values and local cultures in developing effective legal structures.
She believes that placing new laws on the books is less important than the
way a country implements existing laws, and that proper implementation
requires a broader understanding of a country’s social values. Legal
reforms will be successful only if their implementation includes an
understanding of what the culture views as fair and reasonable.
As an example, Gregory discussed the difﬁculties associated with
improving a country’s corporate governance practices. Countries with
effective corporate governance have a ﬁnancial sector that allows inves-
tors to monitor and, if necessary, discipline corporate managers so that
funds provided by investors are appropriately, efﬁciently, and proﬁtably
put to use. However, imposing on developing countries the speciﬁc rules
and structures found in countries with successful corporate governance
will often not have the desired results, since such rules and structures are
not ﬁxed or absolute, but require ﬂexibility and judgment and must ﬁt
within the cultural values of a country. Consider bankruptcy laws.
Gregory noted that the United States has a culture that is accepting of
failure, one that encourages individuals to start over and try again. This
is in sharp contrast to the values of many Asian cultures.
Gregory believes that legal reforms should not be imposed by
international organizations or governments. To be effective, reform
requires adaptation to local conditions and social values. Since the private
sector is so important in creating the necessary institutions for efﬁcient
corporate governance, she argued that any effort at reform must involve,
and even be driven, by the private sector. In many nations, this will
require signiﬁcant dialogue and education to encourage the private sector
to value and support corporate governance reform efforts.
The second discussant, Mark A. Walker, questioned how critical the
differences in legal structure were to the severity of the East Asian crisis.
He noted that investors seemed little concerned with the lack of legal
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apparent certainty imposed by dictatorial regimes over more mercurial
political regimes that were more democratic. Furthermore, while the
countries that suffered the most in the crisis tended to have deﬁcient legal
structures, they also tended to have lower per capita incomes, poor
employment practices, and more dependence on foreign direct invest-
ment. The correlation between inadequate legal structures and economic
weakness makes it difﬁcult to ascertain the degree to which inadequate
legal institutions exacerbated the crisis.
Walker also discussed the difﬁculty of successfully imposing new
legal structures that create a system of rule by law. He believes that the
reform process needs a democratic element: not necessarily a political
democracy, but a framework in which consensus is developed so that
there is broad acceptance of the principles behind the reform. He also
stressed the importance of equal application of the law—that the new
rules be applicable not just to private participants, but to government
participants as well. He pointed out that these conditions did not always
hold for the reforms imposed by international organizations on some of
the crisis countries. In fact, in some countries, the advocacy of reform by
international organizations was interpreted as promoting the power of
the existing ruling elite. This fueled skepticism toward reform, since the
political elite were the ones who most beneﬁted from the earlier corrupt
processes. Without legal structures that enjoy popular support, reforms
are unlikely to take root, particularly if citizens view the reforms as unfair
and imposed from abroad.
The general discussion further emphasized the importance of adapt-
ing the legal system to local customs and developing legal precedents, so
that the rule of law becomes ﬁrmly established. Several speakers were
concerned that the formal presentations seem to imply that effective legal
infrastructure would not develop for decades, leaving countries vulner-
able to serious disruptions in the interim. While the presenters generally
agreed that it would take considerable time, they nonetheless believe that
many countries have made considerable strides in improving their legal
infrastructure. Many currently have reasonable statutes, and while im-
plementation remains problematic, countries can make improvements in
this regard over a shorter period.
Finally, some discussion focused on the interaction between the legal
system and the rest of the ﬁnancial infrastructure. In particular, it was
stated that the role of bank supervision becomes increasingly important,
the more inadequate a country’s legal system. Since countries with fewer
protections for investors turn to bank-intermediated ﬁnance, commonly
backed by implicit or explicit government guarantees, it becomes increas-
ingly important that the bank regulatory system protect against excessive
risk-taking in the industry.
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REDUCING FINANCIAL RISKS IN THE MARKET
S. P. Kothari questioned the value of mandating stricter accounting
standards. He picked up on two themes that had been raised in the ﬁrst
session: the importance of differentiating between imposing new rules
and enforcing existing rules, and the importance of understanding the
cultural norms of a country before advocating speciﬁc reforms. He
argued that a market existed for accounting standards and policies on
corporate disclosure, and that it is subject to supply and demand
pressures just like any other market.
In countries with good law enforcement, common law, and adequate
protection of investor rights, Kothari thinks that most disclosure require-
ments are unnecessary. He believes that market forces would require
corporations to voluntarily disclose the appropriate amount of informa-
tion. Each ﬁrm would compare the costs of creating and disclosing
detailed ﬁnancial information with the cost of capital it would face if that
information were not disclosed. Each ﬁrm would then decide, on its own,
the appropriate, proﬁt-maximizing level of disclosure. For ﬁrms where
the market demanded a high degree of disclosure, such as ﬁrms reliant on
new technology, disclosure would be extensive. For ﬁrms in industries
that are transparent and easily monitored, the demand for disclosure, and
thus the quantity of disclosed information supplied, would be low.
Requiring one set of accounting standards for all ﬁrms would be
inefﬁcient: Using the above example, the new technology company would
voluntarily disclose much more than the minimum, while even the
minimum standard would force the transparent company to supply an
unnecessary amount of information.
Kothari also argued that imposing accounting standards, without the
effective enforcement of investor protections, will have very little impact
on the development of sound capital markets. He cited empirical research
that shows that the enforcement of investor protections lowers the cost of
capital, whereas the mere existence of high-quality accounting standards,
without corresponding enforcement, has no impact on the cost of capital.
He argued that the availability of external ﬁnance depends crucially on
investor protections. If managers face few consequences for acting in their
own self-interest, outside investors will limit the resources available to
such ﬁrms. Weak enforcement limits the development of the capital
markets in many countries and, in turn, adversely affects the economic
well-being in those countries.
Kothari then discussed the impact of imposing accounting standards
on countries where law enforcement is lax and investor protections are
minimal. He noted that ownership and governance structures have
developed there in a way that reduces the demand for signiﬁcant
accounting resources. Ownership is often highly concentrated and bank-
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the information asymmetries are greatly reduced with such a structure,
the demand for accounting information is low, and mandatory rules will
require more disclosure than is warranted, given the corporate gover-
nance structure.
Kothari concluded that appropriate accounting reform should be
developed in conjunction with reforms to the legal system. Institutional
factors such as investor protection and law enforcement signiﬁcantly
affect the demand for high-quality public disclosure. Kothari believes that
a policy of strong enforcement of investor protections can result in an
increase in the supply of external ﬁnance and an increase in the demand
for public disclosure; these in turn would force improvement in ﬁnancial
disclosure, regardless of the quality of mandated accounting standards.
Both discussants strongly disagreed with the proposition that ac-
counting standards might be unnecessary, while agreeing that enforce-
ment and investor protection are important. Gerhard G. Mueller stated
that poor enforcement does not imply that mandated accounting stan-
dards are unnecessary; rather, it implies a need to develop improved
enforcement in conjunction with setting of standards. In particular,
Mueller is concerned that ﬁrms will not disclose bad news if the decision
to disclose is left to them. Thus, a negative externality will be introduced
into the market, because investors will worry that material bad news
remains undisclosed. This fear can make investors more reluctant to
invest in all companies.
The second discussant, Marisa Lago, applauded Kothari’s focus on
the multidimensional aspects of ﬁnancial reporting. She agreed that the
usefulness of ﬁnancial reports is affected not only by accounting stan-
dards but also by corporate governance, legal systems, and enforcement
policies. However, she too disagreed with the proposition that countries
should allow individual ﬁrms to do their own cost-beneﬁt analysis when
determining the level of disclosure. She too believes that such a policy
would prove costly because it would reduce investor conﬁdence in the
market as a whole. Investors would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to differentiate good
disclosers from bad disclosers, and all ﬁrms would end up facing a higher
cost of capital. However, in addition to her belief in mandated accounting
standards, Lago strongly afﬁrmed the need for enhanced enforcement,
through higher-quality audits, continuing supervisory reviews of ﬁlings,
and active prosecution of ﬁrms that fail to disclose material events.
The general discussion included a spirited debate on the advisabil-
ity of imposing international accounting standards. Kothari emphasized
that adopting a single international standard could have a serious
adverse consequence—stiﬂing competition in setting standards. With
different standards in different markets, the better standards will emerge
as the ones that survive. If a market imposes costly ineffective standards,
ﬁrms and investors will ﬂee to markets with more appropriate standards.
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the adoption of standards that investors value highly and the elimination
of costly inefﬁcient standards. Kothari made the point that as a profession
we economists welcome the concept of competition in markets, and we
should welcome competition in the market for ﬁnancial reporting as well.
In response, many attendees stated that competition in standard-
setting would prove to be costly. First, analysts have had great difﬁculty
interpreting ﬁnancial statements when companies switch their standard
or have the option of issuing different ﬁnancial statements depending on
the country where the ﬁrm is reporting. Second, some believe that
international standards provide a public good, by raising minimum
standards in countries with serious deﬁciencies in accounting infrastruc-
tures. Finally, several participants believe that international standards
would also encourage greater international enforcement of accounting
standards. While there was no consensus among participants on setting a
single international standard, it was widely agreed that better enforce-
ment was critical to improving the accounting infrastructure in emerging
economies.
REFORMING BANK SUPERVISION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Ruth de Krivoy expanded on several themes of the conference in her
paper on reforming bank supervision. She stressed the importance of
effective implementation, a theme emphasized in both the legal and
accounting sessions. While many countries have adopted regulations
consistent with more effective supervision, implementation requires
providing the appropriate incentives so that banks and their supervisors
act responsibly. She emphasized that the inadequacies in bank supervi-
sion in emerging economies are due not to a lack of understanding of
what constitutes sound policy but rather to insufﬁcient resources and
political will to allow bank supervision to be proactive.
Krivoy highlighted several difﬁculties bank supervisors have faced
in effectively implementing policies consistent with international banking
standards. First, many supervisors have insufﬁcient independence from
special interests or the political process. She argued that supervisors
should not be subject to removal when it was politically beneﬁcial.
Second, many bank supervisors in emerging countries lack the ﬁnancial
resources to do an effective job. With limited personnel and few
computers, implementation is difﬁcult. This inadequacy of resources
frequently reﬂects the ambiguity that many politicians feel about proac-
tive supervision.
Finally, Krivoy pointed out that the legal framework was often at
variance with effective supervision, noting that differences between
common law legal systems and civil law legal systems affect bank
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able to adapt to the unique experiences and ﬁnancial characteristics of the
local ﬁnancial system. In contrast, civil law only allows bank supervisors
to enforce laws that are explicitly enumerated, giving supervisors little
latitude to restrict behavior that they consider ﬁnancially risky but that is
not explicitly restricted by the legal code. In civil law countries, supervi-
sors have at times been subject to personal liability suits for exceeding
their powers, even if such discretion would have provided a more stable
banking environment.
Krivoy recommended that emerging economies take steps to make
bank supervision a priority. One suggestion was housing bank supervi-
sion in the central bank. Central banks have more and better resources
than other government agencies, and thus they can hire more competent
personnel and put in place adequate computer facilities. Moreover,
central banks tend to have political support for independence, and
housing the supervisory authority in the central bank could raise the
status of bank supervision. Bank supervisors must have the ability and
the authority to intervene early when banking problems arise. This
requires prudent analysis of timely information, with a clear authority to
intervene when it is judged appropriate.
The ﬁrst discussant, Frederic S. Mishkin, emphasized the role of
politics. He believes that without political support, prudential supervi-
sion will not be successful regardless of supervisory rules and regula-
tions. He emphasized that the vast majority of economists agree on what
constitutes prudential supervision, but politicians need to provide ﬁnan-
cial support, legal protections, and independence for bank supervisors.
Mishkin also pointed out that another means of improving emerging
market banking systems, one that also requires political support, is
allowing the entry of foreign banks. Foreign entry, while politically
difﬁcult, can substantially strengthen the domestic banking system. First,
the host country beneﬁts when the ﬁnancial condition of well-diversiﬁed
foreign banks is not closely tied to local economic conditions. Second,
because most internationally active banks are well-managed institutions
with long histories, their presence introduces best practices into the
country. Foreign entry has collateral beneﬁts for supervisors, because in
the process of examining the foreign bank, supervisors can ascertain best
practices and apply pressure on banks not employing these practices.
The second discussant, John G. Heimann, focused on the implemen-
tation and enforcement theme running through the conference. He
discussed his involvement with an institution created by the Bank of
International Settlements and the Basle Supervisory Committee, the
Financial Stability Institute (FSI). FSI’s primary mission is to help emerg-
ing economies develop a strong and sound ﬁnancial system. “Operating
on the ground level,” FSI focuses its attention on offering practical
solutions to the implementation of core principles in banking, insurance,
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emerging economies have limited resources. Heimann believes that
political impediments are the true obstacles to sound bank supervision.
Heimann described as an example the problem of connected lending.
Most would agree about the perils associated with connected lending. In
practice, though, many emerging economies have difﬁculty implement-
ing sound policies in this area because the beneﬁciaries of such lending
are usually also politically well-connected. This is where the FIS can help.
For many countries, having an outside source provide standards offers
cover for supervisors trying to introduce regulations that lack wide-
spread local political support. With the FSI providing information on
standard practices regarding such matters as connected lending, risk
management, and corporate governance, supervisors in emerging coun-
tries can argue that such policies are necessary to bring the country up to
prevailing international standards. Thus, outside international advisors
can play an important role in both educating supervisors and facilitating
the implementation of politically unpopular regulations that can signiﬁ-
cantly improve a country’s ﬁnancial infrastructure.
The general discussion focused on two issues. First, what role
should foreign bank penetration play in emerging economies’ ﬁnancial
systems? Some believe that a foreign banking presence beneﬁts the
domestic ﬁnancial system by enhancing competition and introducing
“best practices,” forcing domestic ﬁrms to improve in such areas as risk
management. Others highlighted the potential adverse effects, noting that
an increase in foreign penetration slows down the implementation of
domestic ﬁnancial sector reform, and that too much penetration by a
single foreign country makes the domestic economy particularly sensitive
to conditions in that foreign country.
The second issue was whether banking supervisory and regulatory
policies should be uniform across countries. Unlike the arguments made
in the accounting and legal sessions that emphasized tailoring the
infrastructure to the political and cultural values of individual countries,
most agreed that such a recommendation has not worked for bank
supervision. The discussants felt that allowing countries to contend that
“they were different” was just an excuse for those countries to do a poor
job at implementing sound bank supervision.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE BANKING
SECTOR:T HE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
Eric S. Rosengren presented a paper, written with Joe Peek, exam-
ining the impact of foreign bank entry into Latin America. Their focus
was the concern that foreign banks have weak ties with domestic
borrowers and that during times of economic hardship, foreign banks
will fail to provide needed credit to domestic ﬁrms. The evidence from
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the opposite. During host country economic problems, foreign bank
penetration increased. Most of the expansion was the result of increased
lending by subsidiaries of foreign banks; more modest increases occurred
in cross-border lending.
These results highlight a problem facing emerging economies that
restrict foreign entry into their domestic banking systems. Currently,
many countries have restrictions on foreign banks directly operating
subsidiaries in their country, but they place far fewer restrictions on
cross-border lending. This biases the foreign bank presence toward
cross-border lending. Rosengren pointed out that the evidence provided
by Latin America suggests that such restrictions can have potentially
adverse effects on the composition of foreign lending in the domestic
economy. He noted that most cross-border lending by foreign banks is in
wholesale operations, catering to large ﬁrms and the government sector.
In contrast, foreign bank subsidiaries, with their brick-and-mortar oper-
ations, can focus on developing long-term retail lending and deposit
relationships. These in-country operations are more stable than cross-
border relationships. Thus, restrictions on foreign subsidiary entry may
discourage the very lending that is least likely to ﬂee during a crisis.
Furthermore, Rosengren noted that foreign bank subsidiaries can
also enhance competition, introduce new management techniques, and
increase the use of advanced information technology in the domestic
banking markets. Collateral beneﬁts also come from having better-
diversiﬁed ﬁnancial institutions operating in the domestic ﬁnancial
sector. Finally, he cautioned that even though emerging economies
beneﬁt from foreign bank entry, such entry requires better coordination
between home and host country bank supervisors.
The ﬁrst discussant, Joseph R. Bisignano, thinks it is still too soon to
draw ﬁrm conclusions from the presence of foreign banks in Latin
America. Much of the liberalization of the banking sector and most
foreign bank entry has occurred in the past ﬁve years and, despite a
number of shocks that have buffeted these countries, the reaction of
Spanish and American banks to sustained problems in Latin America has
yet to be tested. In particular, Bisignano noted examples of foreign banks
operating elsewhere in the world that failed to provide the beneﬁcial
effects of foreign penetration discussed by Rosengren. He highlighted the
operations of Japanese banks in many of the Asian countries, as well as
BCCI in many of its host countries. He warned that the same may
eventually be true in Latin America.
Andrew Powell commented on foreign bank penetration in Argen-
tina. He explained that the banking industry is not the only sector in
Argentina receiving foreign investment. The Argentine manufacturing,
utility, and oil sectors have all experienced substantial foreign direct
investment. Powell believes that the force driving foreign direct invest-
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speciﬁc policies related to permissibility of foreign bank operations.
Furthermore, Powell noted that the Argentine ﬁnancial sector should be
particularly attractive to foreign banks because of its growth opportuni-
ties, since the size of the ﬁnancial sector relative to GDP is still quite small.
Overall, though, Powell agreed with Rosengren and Peek’s ﬁndings
concerning the activities of foreign banks currently operating in Argen-
tina. Powell stated that foreign banks have tended to behave much like
their Argentine counterparts in times of crisis, and their entry has
contributed to a more efﬁcient and competitive banking system.
The general discussion in this session focused on whether emerging
countries should prefer foreign bank penetration to occur through
branches or through subsidiaries. Some participants believe subsidiaries
would be the more beneﬁcial route, since subsidiaries are required to
have capital in the country and have tended to behave more like domestic
banks. In contrast, branches have tended to be wholesale operations,
which the foreign parent can close down more easily. However, it was
also pointed out that foreign banks sometimes drafted legal documents so
that only the capital of the subsidiary operating in the host country is at
risk, not the capital of the parent bank. This action limits the parent
company’s exposure to the subsidiary bank but, in doing so, reduces the
beneﬁts of having subsidiaries of well-diversiﬁed and ﬁnancially strong
foreign banks operating in the domestic market. Unfortunately, a more
rigorous analysis that distinguishes between offshore lending, branch
lending, and subsidiary lending is not possible because of inadequacies in
the available data.
COASE AND THE REFORM OF SECURITIES MARKETS
Simon Johnson presented a paper on securities markets reform. He
reviewed an extensive empirical literature that considers the relationship
between economic prosperity and the quality of a country’s institutions.
The primary question examined in these studies is whether “institutions
matter.” Is the long-term economic growth of a country improved by
having effective legal and regulatory systems that enforce the laws and
regulations, protect investors’ rights, and require adequate ﬁnancial
disclosure? The alternative hypothesis, that institutions do not matter,
draws on the seminal work of Ronald Coase. Coase’s argument was that
institutions should not be important determinants of economic prosperity
because ﬁrms and investors can establish private contracts to circumvent
poor legal and ﬁnancial infrastructure. In the extreme, ﬁrms operating in
countries with particularly poor legal and ﬁnancial infrastructures could
use the infrastructure of countries with strong institutions, contracting in
those countries or listing securities in those countries.
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vides strong support for the hypothesis that institutions do matter. He
discussed the ﬁndings of cross-country regression analyses that show that
countries with strong institutions experienced higher long-term economic
growth. He also provided several speciﬁc examples supporting these
ﬁndings. One example was the success that Poland has had in its
transition to a market-based economy. In designing reform, Poland
imposed signiﬁcant regulations to protect investors’ rights and expended
resources to develop institutions that enforce the regulations. The result
has been a successful transition from its communist period. In contrast,
the Czech Republic decided to set far fewer institutional protections for
investors, relying more on market forces and reputation effects to protect
the integrity of markets. Unfortunately, the Czech Republic has had far
less success than Poland and has suffered through a series of ﬁnancial
crises.
Johnson also provided evidence that strong institutions allow coun-
tries to weather ﬁnancial crises better, in addition to their beneﬁcial effect
on long-term economic growth. In the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis, coun-
tries with stronger institutions handled the crisis better than those with
weaker institutions, in terms of both the degree to which the crisis
affected the country and the country’s ability to recover from the crisis. To
support this view, he compared Korea’s experience during the crisis with
Indonesia’s, arguing that Korea’s securities market reform allowed it to
weather the crisis better.
In terms of policy recommendations, Johnson urged emerging econ-
omies to push forward with securities market reform. He acknowledged
the difﬁculty of imposing widespread reform on the legal, accounting,
and regulatory systems of a country. However, he explained that creating
a new securities market in a country can be a worthwhile alternative to
widespread reform. Johnson described the beneﬁcial effects of the newly
created securities markets in Germany and in Korea. Both of these
markets have stricter listing requirements than other domestic securities
exchanges, resulting in the improvement of investor protections, account-
ing standards, and corporate governance. These new markets have
provided an alternative source of funds for many new ﬁrms, especially in
technology-related areas. Given the success of these new markets and the
positive impact on economic activity, Johnson urged emerging economies
to mimic the recent developments in Germany and Korea, if broader
reform proves to be politically unacceptable.
The ﬁrst discussant, Annette L. Nazareth, drawing on her experi-
ences at the Securities and Exchange Commission, emphasized that a
regulatory framework speciﬁcally designed to ensure investor protection
and to enhance market transparency has clear beneﬁts over purely
private sector initiatives. She gave as an example the beneﬁcial effects of
SEC-imposed rules affecting customer orders of Nasdaq-listed stocks.
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prices for customers, allowed customers to use limit orders more effec-
tively, and improved information on prevailing prices, curtailing ques-
tionable behavior of Nasdaq market makers. These improvements only
occurred after SEC intervention. Nazareth also discussed the importance
of strong investor protections and disclosure policy in the international
context, emphasizing that investors in increasingly global markets are
demanding greater standardization across countries. She hoped stan-
dards in emerging economies would converge toward those in the United
States.
The second discussant, Donald H. Straszheim, agreed that many
emerging economies need to improve their legal and ﬁnancial infrastruc-
ture. However, he argued that one must be cautious in making policy
inferences from existing empirical work, because such analyses have
done a poor job of incorporating adequate institutional detail. He cited
the makeup of the Finnish stock market to support his claim. Nokia, a
successful internationally active ﬁrm, makes up 60 percent of the total
market capitalization of the Finnish stock market. Because the bulk of
Nokia’s operations are outside Finland, Nokia faces pressure from global
ﬁnancial markets, not just Finnish markets. Consequently, researchers
must be careful in how they interpret the inﬂuence that the rules and
regulations of the Finnish stock market have on Nokia’s success and, in
turn, the success of the Finnish economy. Noting the inadequacies in the
current literature, Straszheim urged researchers to ﬁnd better ways to
quantify the factors that affect the prosperity of economies. He stressed
the importance of obtaining a better understanding of the factors that
affect countries’ access to capital.
The general discussion focused on why private contracts are not
sufﬁcient in many countries, and why free market solutions have not been
as successful as postulated in much of Ronald Coase’s work. Most
participants felt that the explanation was not that there were ﬂaws in
Coase’s reasoning, but rather the fact that one of the important assump-
tions underlying his arguments is often not satisﬁed. Much of his work
assumed that a judiciary could enforce private contracts. In practice, this
assumption does not hold in many countries. Thus, as an empirical
matter, countries with better securities regulations and enforcement are
attracting capital from around the globe, resulting in better macro-
economic outcomes.
ROUNDTABLE:P OLICIES TO PREVENT FUTURE CRISES
Stanley Fischer began the panel discussion by reexamining ﬁve
factors that were important in the ﬁnancial crises in the 1990s, stating that
improvements in these areas would reduce the likelihood of future crises.
First, countries with ﬁxed exchange rates were at the epicenter of the
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Asia in 1997–98; and Russia in 1998. Second, ﬁnancial operations in the
crisis countries lacked adequate transparency. Fischer believes that more
transparency would have put constraints on the actions of policymakers
and helped avoid some of the economic problems, or at least led to a
public reaction before the problems became crises. The IMF is actively
encouraging countries to collect and disseminate information on the
ﬁnancial condition of their economies. Third, international standards for
ﬁnancial infrastructure are essential. Fischer stressed the need for a broad
application of international standards across countries, and he said that
policymakers should be skeptical of countries claiming to be “different,”
agreeing with Ruth de Krivoy’s assessments. Fourth, countries with large
foreign currency reserves fared better during the crises. Fifth, difﬁculties
in countries’ ﬁnancial sectors substantially heightened macroeconomic
difﬁculties during recent crises. Fisher believes that international organi-
zations must increase their efforts toward improving the ﬁnancial sector
in emerging economies.
The second panelist, Jeffrey A. Goldstein, argued that ﬁnancial
crises are inevitable in many emerging markets because the small size of
their economies prevents them from being well diversiﬁed. He noted that
two-thirds of all countries have ﬁnancial sectors with less than 10 billion
dollars in assets; thus, diversiﬁcation is virtually impossible to achieve in
these countries. Because of this, it is imperative that these countries
improve their ﬁnancial systems by enhancing the transparency of their
ﬁnancial and corporate sectors and by subjecting more economic activity
to market discipline. Goldstein was encouraged by the progress made in
several European and Latin American economies in strengthening their
banking and judicial systems. However, he cautioned that while these
measures are likely to reduce the magnitude of future crises, it is unlikely
that such measures can eliminate their occurrence.
The third panelist, Masaru Yoshitomi, emphasized the role of
massive capital ﬂows in the Asian crisis. Unlike the situation in many
previous crises in emerging economies, the Asian economies received
massive capital inﬂows prior to the crisis. However, these capital ﬂows
quickly reversed direction as currencies came under attack. The wide-
spread use of short-term, foreign-currency-denominated debt exacer-
bated the problems. To help avoid future crises, Yoshitomi suggested
government intervention in ﬂoating exchange-rate systems when the
currency strayed from its fundamental value. He thought countries
should also consider restrictions on short-term capital ﬂows, such as
those tried in Chile. He stressed the importance of countries reducing the
exposure of their domestic banking sector to currency mismatches and
maturity mismatches. Finally, he suggested that there is a need for an
international lender of last resort when countries face sudden large
reversals of capital ﬂows.
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ﬁnancial infrastructures of many countries have failed to develop the
sophistication needed in an increasingly integrated world economy. With
globalization, central banks and ﬁnancial systems face not only domes-
tically created shocks, but also shocks from abroad. The more integrated
the world economy becomes, the more susceptible it is to countries with
weak ﬁnancial infrastructures. To enhance their ﬁnancial infrastructure
before the next crisis, these countries need to make vast improvements in
the quality of ﬁnancial information about ﬁrms and ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries, and they need to develop deeper capital markets that allow ﬁrms to
better diversify their risks. Sheng also believes that the lack of an
international lender of last resort exacerbated the problems associated
with the recent crises.
The general discussion focused on the implications of political
instability. In many of the crisis countries, a political crisis led to the
ﬁnancial crisis. Such a situation makes the job of international organiza-
tions in mitigating the crisis particularly difﬁcult. Some speakers sug-
gested that ﬂoating exchange-rate regimes at least put the political
establishment on notice that their actions have consequences, conse-
quences that are easily observable. Another issue discussed was utilizing
international organizations and the private sector as lender of last resort
facilities. It was noted, however, that substantial resistance exists in many
parts of the world to having an international lender of last resort. In
addition, relatively few lenders are likely to be willing to provide
contingent credit lines at precommitted rates during times of crises,
because the loans would be issued at a time when other investors were
abandoning the country.
The panel discussion ended with the observation that as emerging
economies become larger and more globally integrated, reliance on
domestic relationship-based forms of corporate governance becomes
limiting, and the need for a more international, rule-based corporate
governance system increases. However, the move from a heavily rela-
tionship-based system to a rule-based system will increase a country’s
susceptibility to crises until the rules are effectively and adequately
applied.
CONCLUSION
The limited implementation of infrastructure reform following the
ﬁnancial crisis in 1997–98 has been disappointing. Infrastructure projects,
by their very nature, take time to implement. However, the institutional
and cultural impediments to rapid reform were not fully appreciated in
the immediate aftermath of the crisis. As emerging economies become
more globally integrated, the need to adopt rules and regulations that
allow those countries to compete internationally will increase. Confer-
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regulations, countries must realize that the corporate governance models
and disclosure policies of countries such as the United States may not
transplant well to their own country. Country-speciﬁc characteristics,
such as whether a country has a legal system based on civil or common
law or whether a country depends on close relationships between banks
and corporations, will determine whether a U.S.-based model will
succeed in improving its ﬁnancial infrastructure.
Despite the impediments to improving ﬁnancial infrastructure, some
countries have made progress with reform. The evidence that strong
ﬁnancial infrastructure can improve long-term growth and mitigate the
effects of crises has caused a few countries to ﬁnd innovative solutions to
ﬁnancial infrastructure problems. Almost all participants agreed that
developing countries should focus on implementation and enforcement
issues, an area that probably received too little attention immediately
following the crisis. Countries should place greater emphasis on strength-
ening the judicial process, on improving the enforcement of contracts and
investor rights, and on providing the resources for bank supervisors to
properly oversee the banking and ﬁnancial sectors.
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